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In another time he would have been honored. Instead he was 
murdered.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The above statement is from the PBS documentary Two Spirits, 
a film examining the life and tragic death of Fred Martinez, a sixteen-
year-old Navajo Indian, born physically male, who identified as 
female.2 The documentary explores the circumstances that led to 
 †  Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina, School of Law. 
1. TWO SPIRITS (PBS 2011), 
http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/two-spirits/; see also ICMN Staff, PBS 
Documentary Explores Navajo Belief in Four Genders, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (Nov. 5, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/11 
/05/pbs-documentary-explores-navajo-belief-four-genders-152094. 
2. TWO SPIRITS, supra note 1.
1
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Martinez’s death while also more broadly discussing the treatment 
of gay, lesbian, and transgendered Navajo people.3 As the film notes, 
gender non-conformity was once an accepted part of Navajo 
culture.4 Traditionally, the Navajo recognized four genders: male, 
female, male-born persons living as female, and female-born persons 
living as male, and they held these dual-gender or “two spirit” people 
in high regard.5 The Navajo view of two-spirit people was not 
unique.6 Historically, many American Indian tribes honored their 
transgendered members,7 but by the nineteenth century, this 
tolerance began to disappear.8 European colonizers and their 
descendants viewed homosexuality as an intolerable sin, and they 
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Jeffrey S. Jacobi, Two Spirits, Two Eras, Same Sex: For a Traditionalist Perspective
on Native American Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Policy, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823, 837 
(2006) (discussing the behaviors and relationships of “men,” “women,” “male-
bodied” individuals, and “female-bodied” individuals); see also BRIAN JOSEPH GILLEY,
BECOMING TWO-SPIRIT: GAY IDENTITY AND SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 10–
11 (2006) (stating that “two-spirits” were often seen as having special powers, and 
that many tribes believed “[t]he gender different were possessed of a special 
relationship with the Creator because they were seen as being able to bridge the 
personal and spiritual gap between men and women”); WILL ROSCOE, CHANGING
ONES: THIRD AND FOURTH GENDERS IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 3 (1998) (“accepted 
and sometimes honored”); Jacobi, supra (“Alternative gender roles have been 
documented in approximately 155 tribes . . . .”); id. at 823 (“[H]istorically, many 
tribes accepted and even honored same sex-unions.”). But see TWO-SPIRIT PEOPLE: 
NATIVE AMERICAN GENDER IDENTITY, SEXUALITY, AND SPIRITUALITY 5 (Sue-Ellen Jacobs 
et al. eds., 1997) (criticizing scholars and other non-Natives for an “idealizing view” 
of the past that “has led to a relatively recent romanticization of purported positively 
sanctioned pan-Indian gender or sexual categories that do not fit the reality of 
experiences faced by many contemporary gay, lesbian, third-gender, transgender, 
and otherwise two-spirit Native Americans”). 
6. Jacobi, supra note 5, at 823 (“[M]any [commentators] agree that
indigenous tribes often tolerated and even celebrated [‘Native American individuals 
whose behavior did not comport with European gender norms’].” (citations 
omitted)). 
7. Id.
8. See Trista Wilson, Comment, Changed Embraces, Changes Embraced?
Renouncing the Heterosexist Majority in Favor of a Return to Traditional Two-Spirit Culture, 
36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 161, 173 (2012) (citations omitted) (“Native Americans likely 
responded to the ‘Euro-American condemnation of the gender different’ by hiding 
that part of their culture . . . . As this [European acculturalization and assimilation] 
trend continued, two-spirit culture became increasingly suppressed until, in many 
cases, it was altogether hidden or eliminated.”). 
2
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exerted increasing pressure9 on tribal communities to adopt similar 
views regarding family and sexuality.10 Eventually, this pressure led 
to a dramatic decline in tribal acceptance of homosexual and 
transgendered Indian people.11 
Today, many tribes are rejecting these colonially imposed 
beliefs regarding gender and homosexuality.12 For instance, a 
substantial number of tribes were at the forefront of the fight for 
marriage equality.13 These path-clearing tribes used their unique 
status as separate sovereigns to recognize same-sex marriages before, 
and sometimes in defiance of, the surrounding states.14 In a few 
instances, the marriage codes of these tribes even served as a model 
9. Christian missionaries and Indian agents targeted gender non-conforming
Indians through the provisions of the Religious Crimes Code. See id. (“By the early 
1880s, Christian missionaries and Indian agents were using [these laws] ‘to 
aggressively attack Native sexual and marriage practices,’ and to pressure tribal 
communities to adopt the Euro-American ideals on family and sexuality.”). 
10. In fact, tribes’ acceptance of homosexuality was one of the reasons often
cited as evidence of American Indians’ inferiority and was used as part of the 
justification for the conquest of North America. See GILLEY, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
11. Id. at 13 (stating that Anglo-American aversion towards homosexuality was
clearly “communicated to the Indians,” causing gender non-conforming Indians to 
lead “repressed or disguised lives”). 
12. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 175 (“Two-spirit organizations across the
country are engaged in an effort to promote two-spirit culture, both inside and 
outside Indian Country. And although some tribes have legislated against same-sex 
marriage, others have affirmatively legislated in its favor.”); see also Ann E. Tweedy, 
Tribal Laws & Same-Sex Marriage: Theory, Process, and Content, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 104, 110 (2015) (“Twelve tribes are known to allow same-sex marriage, either 
due to amendments to tribal laws, interpretation of a pre-existing marriage law, or, 
in one case, the explicit incorporation of state marriage law.”). 
13. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 12, at 110–31 (discussing laws, ranging from
explicit recognition of same-sex marriage to potential recognition of same-sex 
relationships performed in other places, created by various Native American tribes); 
see also Julie Bushyhead, The Coquille Indian Tribe, Same-Sex Marriage, and Spousal 
Benefits: A Practical Guide, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 509, 530–31 (2009) (noting 
that, in 2008, the Coquille Indian Tribe in Oregon passed a law allowing same-sex 
marriage). 
14. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 12, at 112 (“At the time Coquille [in Oregon]
passed its law in February 2008, Massachusetts was the only state that allowed same-
sex marriage.”). Similarly, the Suquamish Tribe of Washington legalized same-sex 
marriage well before the state of Washington, where it is located. See Ashley Fantz, 
Washington Voters Pass Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.cnn 
.com/2012/11/09/us/washington-passes-same-sex-marriage/index.html; William 
Yardley, A Washington State Indian Tribe Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/12tribe.html. 
3
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for subsequent state legalization.15 Similarly, many tribes are also 
rediscovering their “two-spirit” traditions.16 These tribes once again 
recognize the value of their transgender members, and their 
approach to gender and sexuality is increasingly proffered as a 
model of tolerance that LGBT advocates believe should be adopted 
by both Indian and non-Indian communities.17 Such changes are 
encouraging. Unfortunately, they are not universal. Two years after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,18 in which the 
Court found same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional, many tribes 
display little interest in accepting same-sex marriage or the two-spirit 
tradition.19 
Currently, a significant number of tribes still ban same-sex 
marriage.20 Prior to the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision, this ban 
15. See, e.g., Walter L. Williams, The ‘Two-Spirit’ People of Indigenous North
Americans, GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com 
/music/2010/oct/11/two-spirit-people-north-america; see also Wilhelm Murg, 
Momentum Mounts to Again Embrace Two-Spirits, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK 
(June 6, 2011), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/momentum 
-mounts-to-again-embrace-two-spirits/ (discussing the re-incorporation of a gender 
variant identity into many tribal cultures). 
16. Wilson, supra note 8, at 176 (“During the 1990s, the LGBT Native American
community began emphasizing their unique place within the gay community by 
focusing on the rich history of two-spirit culture and the value tribes traditionally 
placed on those individuals.”). 
17. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 5, at 848 (encouraging tribes to use their
“sovereignty to make independent decisions on this matter [of same-sex marriage]” 
and warning that they “should be wary of disregarding their traditions, which are 
integral to tribal identity”); Wilson, supra note 8, at 163 (urging tribes to break with 
“prejudicial state precedent” and endorsing “tribal government recognition of 
same-sex marriage, with the goals of returning to traditional tribal values, 
promoting inclusivity within the tribal community”). 
18. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
19. See Tweedy, supra note 12, at 131–32 (discussing twelve tribes that, as of
2012, had Defense of Marriage Acts); see also Jacobi, supra note 5, at 846 (“[M]any 
Native American tribes have disregarded the traditional respect given two-spirits, 
and adopted European American and Christian views on homosexuality and gender 
difference.”). 
20. See infra note 23 (discussing tribal bans). In addition, it should be noted
that the discrimination against LGBT tribal members is not limited to marriage. See, 
e.g., Eben Blake, Native American LGBT Discrimination: Obama Administration Pushing
Housing Protections for Gays on Tribal Land, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 28, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/native-american-lgbt-discrimination-obama      
-administration-pushing-housing-protections-1942835 (describing potential 
discrimination in tribal housing projects); see also ICMN Staff, Study: Transgender 
Native Americans Experience Discrimination at Worst Rates, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA
4
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elicited little national notice.21 However, once the Court declared 
state marriage bans unconstitutional, tribal bans became the glaring 
exception to nationwide marriage equality.22 Tribes with same-sex 
marriage bans are now under increasing pressure to adopt the 
Supreme Court’s view of marriage equality and repeal their marriage 
bans.23 In most cases, these requests have been ignored.24  
Tribal marriage bans prevent thousands of native men and 
women from marrying their chosen partners. Moreover, the impact 
NETWORK (Oct. 12, 2012), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/study 
-transgender-native-americans-experience-discrimination-at-worst-rates/ (noting 
that the bias experienced by transgender people “extends into virtually all aspects 
of their lives”). 
21. See Elizabeth Dias, A Gay Marriage Loophole for Native Americans, TIME (Nov.
1, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/11/01/a-gay-marriage-loophole-for-native 
-americans/ (discussing a tribe that granted a same-sex couple a marriage license, 
but also noting that “[t]he wedding has brought attention to a subset of the 
marriage equality movement that often flies under the radar”). 
22. See Ann E. Tweedy, Tribes, Same-Sex Marriage, and Obergefell v. Hodges, FED. 
LAW., Oct.–Nov. 2015, at 6, 6 (“Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed 
that the Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry . . . Indian 
tribes are suddenly the only governmental entities in the United States that have the 
option not to allow same-sex couples to marry within their jurisdictions.”); Steven J. 
Alagna, Note, Why Obergefell Should Not Impact American Indian Tribal Marriage Laws, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1577 (2016) (considering how Native American tribes will be 
impacted by the Supreme Court’s ruling). 
23. See, e.g., Felicia Fonseca, U.S. Same-Sex Marriage Challenged by Native American
Sovereignty, THE STAR (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015 
/11/27/us-same-sex-marriage-challenged-by-native-american-sovereignty.html; 
Marcia Zug, Why Same-Sex Marriage Bans Risk Native American Sovereignty, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10 
/tribal-same-sex-marriage-bans/503345/ (“Couples that live on American Indian 
reservations are beyond the reach of constitutional protections because of the 
unique legal status of Native American tribes . . . . Tribal governments are therefore 
allowed to continue to ban same-sex marriage despite the Court’s ruling.”); Hayley 
Fowler, Gay Marriage Discouraged Within American Indian Tribes, DAILYTARHEEL.COM 
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/08/native-american 
-gay-marriage (discussing the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ marriage ban); 
Matthew Tharrett, Native American Tribes Passing Same-Sex Marriage Bans Ahead of 
Supreme Court Mandate, NEWNOWNEXT (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.newnownext.com/native-american-tribes-passing-same-sex-marriage 
-bans-ahead-of-supreme-court-mandate/04/2015/. 
24. But see Hayley Miller, Cherokee Nation Will Now Recognize Same-Sex Marriage,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cherokee-nation-will-now-recognize-same   
-sex-marriage_us_584b061fe4b04c8e2bafca0e (discussing the reversal of the 
Cherokee nation’s same-sex marriage ban). 
5
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of these bans may extend far beyond individual couples. Historically, 
when tribal and Anglo-American values conflict, the result is an 
increased perception by non-Indians that tribes are backwards, 
inferior, and unjust, and this effect is particularly pronounced in 
instances where tribal law or custom reflect a position specifically 
and forcefully rejected by American law.25 Consequently, there is a 
real danger that the continuation of tribal same-sex marriage bans 
post-Obergefell will negatively affect how tribes and tribal justice are 
perceived. This perception could then become the catalyst for 
reversing many of the recent gains in tribal court jurisdiction.26 
This article examines the potential impact of tribal same-sex 
marriage bans in light of America’s long history of distrusting and 
dismantling Indian traditions that conflict with contemporary 
American beliefs regarding fairness and morality. As this article 
demonstrates, the appeal to tradition has not fared well in same-sex 
marriage debates, and this is likely to hold true in the Indian law 
context as well. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court specifically rejected 
arguments based on tradition and held that regardless of tradition, 
laws limiting marriage to one man and one woman no longer reflect 
contemporary understandings of equality and cannot continue.27 
Tribes argue they are not bound by Obergefell and have the right to 
continue to promote their traditional concept of marriage.28 They 
25. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard
Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. 
L. REV. 219, 274 (1986) (“Tribes must exercise their ‘rights’ to self-determination so 
as not to conflict with the interests of the dominant sovereign. In effect, this form 
of discourse enforces a highly efficient process of legal auto-genocide, the ultimate 
hegemonic effect of which is to instruct the savage to self-extinguish all troublesome 
expressions of difference that diverge from the white man’s own hierarchic, 
universalized worldview.”). 
26. See infra Part IV.
27. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“The right to marry is
fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient 
sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how 
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era . . . . 
[W]hen [opposition to same-sex marriage] becomes enacted law and public policy, 
the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an 
exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then 
denied.”). 
28. For example, Otto Tso, a Navajo legislator and medicine man, stated, “We
have to look at our culture, our society, where we come from, [and] talk to our 
elders.” Julie Turkewitz, Among the Navajos, a Renewed Debate About Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/us/among-the 
6
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are correct. However, due to their potential to influence national 
perceptions regarding tribal justice, tribes should be wary of making 
such arguments. In recent years, tribes have slowly been permitted 
to increase their authority over crimes perpetrated by non-Indians 
on tribal lands. Unfortunately, negative perceptions of tribal fairness 
could quickly eliminate these important gains. 
American courts and legislatures have frequently used the 
difference, or at least the supposed difference, between Indian and 
non-Indian values to justify limiting tribal sovereignty.29 
Consequently, although tribes have the right to ban same-sex 
marriages, there is a real danger that these bans will reinforce the 
long-standing and deeply-entrenched belief that tribal laws and 
customs are unjust and that tribal jurisdiction should be limited. 
Thus, the dangerous irony of tribal marriage bans is that these laws 
may ultimately wind up threatening the very sovereignty tribes rely 
upon to defend them. 
Part II of this article discusses the semi-sovereign status of tribes 
and explains how this status enables tribes to ban same-sex marriage 
post-Obergefell.30 Part III examines the connection between Indian 
sovereignty and conflicts between Indian and non-Indian customs.31 
-navajos-a-renewed-debate-about-gay-marriage.html. Other Navajo members 
echoed these sentiments. Supporters of the Navajo marriage ban, such as Katherine 
Benally, argued that the ban “would strengthen our traditional values.” 2005 Diné 
Coalition for Cultural Preservation, A History of the Dine Marriage Act and the Efforts to 
Stop It from Becoming Law, NATIVE OUT (Apr. 22, 2005), http://nativeout.com 
/twospirit-rc/tribal-marriage-equality/dine-marriage-act-of-2005/. Navajo member 
Harriet Becenti noted, “Men and women have been created in a sacred manner. We 
need to honor this.” Id. Orlanda Smith-Hodge stated, “Many tell us our teachings 
come from our home. Our elders have taught us much, and unfortunately it appears 
we are leaving our traditional values. [The ban] is moving in the spirit of preserving 
cultural teachings.” Id. 
Similar arguments were also made by Todd Hembree, the lawyer for the 
Cherokee Nation who drafted the amendment banning same-sex marriage. 
Hembree defended the ban, stating, “‘Cherokees have a strong traditional sense of 
marriage,’ and ‘[t]hroughout [Cherokee] history, there’s never been a tribal 
recognition of same-sex marriage.’” Jacobi, supra note 5, at 828–29. The Cherokee 
Nation has now reversed its position on same-sex marriage. Interestingly, this 
reversal is also justified by reference to Cherokee culture and tradition. 
29. See generally Matthew Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against
Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2007). 
30. Infra Part II.
31. Infra Part III.
7
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Using the well-known decisions of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez32 and 
the Cherokee Freedmen cases,33 this Part demonstrates that 
assertions of tribal sovereignty in contested-values cases can create 
the perception that Indian sovereignty perpetuates unjust and 
problematic values.34 Part IV examines the recent Dollar General35 
decision and argues that cases like Dollar General, which were brought 
to limit tribal sovereignty, and cases like Santa Clara and the 
Cherokee Freedmen cases, which attempt to affirm that sovereignty, 
are actually two sides of the same coin.36 The latter are typically 
described as “wins” for tribal sovereignty, but they have actually been 
instrumental in undermining it.37 As Dollar General demonstrates, 
fear of tribal custom and tradition remain an effective means of 
attacking tribal jurisdiction.38 Finally, Part V explores the recent 
gains in tribal criminal jurisdiction.39 This article concludes by 
suggesting that the assertion of tribal sovereignty in the same-sex 
marriage context risks increasing the perception that tribes are 
unjust and potentially reversing the recent increases in tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.40 
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court declared same-sex 
marriage bans unconstitutional pursuant to both the Due Process 
32. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
33. Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1460–61 (10th Cir. 1989);
Cherokee Nation Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, 2011 WL 8843901 (Cherokee 
Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011); Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, JAT-04-09 
(Cherokee App. Trib. Mar. 7, 2006), rev’g Riggs v. Ummerteskee, JAT-97-03-K 
(Cherokee App. Trib. Aug. 15, 2001). 
34. Infra Part III.
35. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
36. Infra Part IV.
37. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to S. Joe Crittenden, Acting Principal Chief, The 
Cherokee Nation (Sept. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/news/tribal/6005-letter-from-echo-hawk 
-regarding-cherokee-freedmen-upcoming-election (expressing that the federal 
government may not honor recent tribal decisions because said actions do not line 
up with previous treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the U.S. government). 
38. Cf. Aaron F. Arnold et al., State and Tribal Courts: Strategies for Bridging the
Divide, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 801, 816–18 (2012) (discussing misperceptions about tribal 
law arising from the significant scrutiny to which tribal law has been subjected). 
39. Infra Part V.
40. Infra Part V.
8
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and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.41 As a result of this decision, state marriage bans 
immediately became unenforceable.42 Nevertheless, despite the 
Obergefell decision, tribal marriage bans remain in effect.43 
Tribes approach same-sex marriage in a variety of different ways. 
A number of tribes were at the forefront of the same-sex marriage 
movement,44 but others, including the Navajo, the largest federally 
recognized tribe, continue to ban such unions.45 The Navajo alone 
have a population of more than 300,000 members,46 and there are 
at least another 350,000 members of smaller tribes who are also 
41. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry
is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the 
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”). 
42. Id. at 2607–08 (“The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that that the Court 
must also hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to 
refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the 
ground of its same-sex character.”) 
43. See Zug, supra note 23 (discussing tribes that continue to allow same-sex
marriage bans, even after Obergefell). 
44. For example, the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel, located near San Diego,
California, enacted its marriage resolution before same-sex marriage became legal 
in California. Tweedy, supra note 12, at 125 (noting that the Tribe’s “resolution was 
passed before the Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, in which the 
Supreme Court indirectly legalized same-sex marriage in California”); Jean 
Walcher, California Native American Tribe Announces Support of Same Sex Marriage: 
Santa Ysabel Tribe First in California to Make Proclamation, BUS. WIRE (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130624005344/en/California      
-Native-American-Tribe-Announces-Support-Sex. Similarly, Oregon’s Collville Tribe 
and Oklahoma’s Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes each recognized same-sex marriages 
before their respective states did so. Andrew Potts, 8th US Native American Tribe Allows 
Same-Sex Couples to Wed, GAY STAR NEWS (Nov. 16, 2013), 
www.gaystarnews.com/article/8th-us-native-american-tribe-allows-same-sex-couples 
-wed161113/#gs.Pu=_B7g. Other tribes supportive of same-sex marriage before 
Obergefell include the Coquille, Suquamish, Pokagon, Tlingit and Haida, Puyallup, 
Mashantucket Pequot, Colville, Little Traverse, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Leech Lake 
Band of Ojibwe, Eastern Shoshone, Northern Arapaho, Iipay Nation of Santa 
Ysabel, and Keweenaw Bay Indian Community. Tweedy, supra note 12, at 110–11.
45. See Alagna, supra note 22, at 1586 (“At least eleven tribal sovereigns have
legislative bans on same-sex marriage, including . . . the Navajo Nation.” (citations 
omitted)). 
46. Bill Donovan, Census: Navajo Enrollment Tops 300,000, NAVAJO TIMES (July 7,
2011), http://navajotimes.com/news/2011/0711/070711census.php. 
9
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affected by tribal marriage bans.47 Consequently, even after Obergefell, 
there are hundreds of thousands of Americans still subject to same-
sex marriage bans. 
Tribal bans remain in effect post-Obergefell for two reasons. The 
first is that the provisions in the Bill of Rights bind states and the 
federal government, but they do not bind tribes.48 As the Supreme 
Court explained in Talton v. Mayes,49 Indian tribes 
were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-
independent position when they preserved their tribal 
relations; not as states, not as nations, not as possessed of 
the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, 
with the power of regulating their internal and social 
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the 
Union, or of the state within whose limits they resided.50 
The second reason Obergefell is not binding on tribes is because 
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), a federal statute that made many 
constitutional provisions applicable to tribes, allows tribes to 
interpret ICRA’s provisions according to their own customs and 
traditions.51 Therefore, although the equal protection and due 
process rights encapsulated in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution are applicable to tribes through 
ICRA, tribal courts are not required to interpret ICRA rights in the 
same way the federal courts have interpreted the corresponding 
constitutional rights.52 
47. James King, Two Largest Native American Tribes in U.S. Ban Gay Marriage,
VOCATIV (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.vocativ.com/culture/lgbt/two-largest-native 
-american-tribes-in-u-s-ban-gay-marriage/. Tribes with such bans include: “Navajo 
Nation, Blue Lake Rancheria, Chickasaw Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Coos, 
Lower Umqua, and Siuslaw Indians, Grand Traverse Band of Chippewa Indians, Nez 
Perce Tribe, the Oneida Indian Nation, the Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in 
Iowa, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.” Tweedy, supra note 12, at 131–32. 
48. See id. at 147 (“[T]ribes, being distinct from both states and the federal
government, are not generally subject to the constitutional obligations in the Bill of 
Rights.”).
49. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
50. Id. at 384.
51. See Tweedy, supra note 22, at *7 (“[A]lthough tribes are required to abide
by a federal statute that contains equal protection and due process rights, namely 
the ICRA, tribes are empowered to interpret those rights according to their own 
cultures and traditions and need not follow the federal courts’ interpretations of 
what those rights mean.”). 
52. As Professor Ann Tweedy has explained, “ICRA reflects a compromise
between protecting tribes’ rights to self-determination and protecting the rights of 
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 3
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss4/3
2017] TRADITIONAL PROBLEMS 771 
The goal of ICRA is to ensure that American Indians receive 
basic constitutional rights and are protected “from arbitrary and 
unjust actions of tribal governments.”53 However, it is not a 
constitutional clone. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme 
Court held that the desire to provide American Indians with 
constitutional protections must be balanced against the well-
established federal “policy of furthering Indian self-government.”54 
The Court confirmed that ICRA’s provisions protect tribal members, 
but it also held that it is up to the tribal governments to determine 
how these provisions will be interpreted and enforced.55 
Santa Clara concerned the Pueblo’s membership rules, which 
permitted male tribal members to pass their tribal membership onto 
their children regardless of the mother’s eligibility but denied a 
reciprocal right to the Pueblo’s female members.56 These sex-based 
membership laws appeared to be a clear case of gender 
discrimination, and, thus, tribal member Julia Martinez challenged 
the rules under the equal protection provision of ICRA.57 In 
considering the case, the Court weighed Martinez’s individual right 
to be free of discrimination against the Pueblo’s interest in 
individual tribal citizens and others who are subject to tribal jurisdiction. If tribes 
were required to interpret ICRA rights in the same manner federal courts interpret 
constitutional rights, this would have an assimilating effect on tribes.” Id.  
53. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1978) (citing S. REP. 
NO. 841, at 5–6 (1967)) (“We note at the outset that a central purpose of the ICRA 
and in particular of Title I was to . . . ‘protect individual Indians from arbitrary and 
unjust actions of tribal governments.’”). 
54. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974)). 
55. Although this article discusses ways in which ICRA allows tribes to offer
what many view as lesser protections, it should be noted that there are also examples 
where tribes have interpreted ICRA provisions to offer greater protections than the 
corresponding constitutional provision. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty 
and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 810 n.70 (1997) (“Some tribes have gone 
further than ICRA’s mandates and ensure the right to counsel for indigent 
defendants in criminal cases.”). One such example is the Navajo tribe. 1 NAVAJO
CODE § 7 (1995) (stating that “nor shall any person be denied the right to have the 
assistance of counsel, at their own expense, and to have defense counsel appointed 
in accordance with the rules of the courts of the Navajo Nation upon satisfactory 
proof to the court of their inability to provide for their own counsel for the defense 
of any punishable offense under the laws of the Navajo Nation”). 
56. See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 49.
57. Id. at 51.
11
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controlling its membership.58 Describing the importance of this 
control, the district court stated it was 
no more or less than a mechanism of social, and to an 
extent psychological and cultural, self-definition. The 
importance of this to Santa Clara or to any other Indian 
tribe cannot be overstressed. In deciding who is and who is 
not a member, the Pueblo decides what it is that makes its 
members unique, what distinguishes a Santa Clara Indian 
from everyone else in the United States.59 
The Supreme Court cited Worchester v. Georgia60 and similar 
cases61 in order to demonstrate that tribes have the right to manage 
their internal decisions and that this right includes membership 
choices.62 The Court agreed that ICRA secured broad constitutional 
protections for tribal members, but it also clarified that 
constitutional protections under ICRA are not necessarily the same 
as the constitutional protections that apply to non-tribal members.63 
According to the Court, the equal protection challenges pursuant to 
ICRA should be evaluated against the background of tribal 
sovereignty, and it specifically noted that ICRA does not require the 
imposition of an Anglo-American standard of equal protection if to 
do so would violate traditional values or harm the “cultural identity” 
of Indian tribes.64 The Santa Clara decision, therefore, confirmed 
58. Id. at 49–50. “This case requires us to decide whether a federal court may
pass on the validity of an Indian tribe’s ordinance denying membership to the 
children of certain female tribal members.” Id. at 51–52. 
59. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 15 (D. N.M. 1975), rev’d,
540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 436 U.S. 49. 
60. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559
(1832)). 
61. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55–56. These cases recognize and affirm tribal
sovereignty. They include: United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States 
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); United States v.
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Roff v. Burney, 168 
U.S. 218 (1897); and United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
62. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55–56.
63. Id. at 60–62 (“Section 1302 [of the ICRA], rather than providing in
wholesale fashion for the extension of constitutional requirements to tribal 
governments . . . selectively incorporated and in some instances modified the 
safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic 
needs of tribal governments.”). 
64. Id. at 72. Quoting the district court in its description of the case, the Santa
Clara Court stated, 
[T]he equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act should 
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that tribal courts, rather than federal courts, should be the primary 
arbiters of ICRA disputes and that Indian tribunals are free to 
consider tribal customs and traditions in their decisions.65 
After Santa Clara, it was clear that tribes are not bound by the 
federal definition of gender equality and, instead, are free to use 
tradition and custom to determine what is fair treatment toward 
their male and female members.66 Santa Clara additionally means 
that tribes are also not bound by the Obergefell Court’s interpretation 
of gender and sex equality. Instead, tribes can evaluate the right to 
same-sex marriage based on their own tribal customs and traditions, 
and they are free to conclude that these traditions and values 
support the continuation of tribal same-sex marriage bans. 
III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY, TRADITION, AND UNFAIRNESS
Santa Clara was considered a win for the tribe and tribal 
sovereignty.67 However, it was not considered a win for Indian 
not be construed in a manner which would require or authorize this 
Court to determine which traditional values will promote cultural 
survival and should therefore should be preserved . . . . Such a 
determination should be made by the people of Santa Clara; not only 
because they can best decide what values are important, but also because 
they must live with the decision every day. . . . 
. . . To abrogate tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of 
membership, for whatever “good” reasons, is to destroy cultural identity 
under the guise of saving it. 
Id. at 54 (citing Santa Clara, 402 F. Supp. at 18–19). 
65. See id. at 65 (“Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and 
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.”); see also id. at 71 (“By not 
exposing tribal officials to the full array of federal remedies available to redress 
actions of federal and state officials, Congress may also have considered that 
resolution of statutory issues under § 1302, and particularly those issues likely to 
arise in a civil context, will frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and 
custom which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than federal 
courts.”). According to the Santa Clara Court, Congress limited the enforcement of 
ICRA claims to tribal court in order to “avoid[] unnecessary intrusions on tribal 
governments.” Id. at 67. Consequently, there is no appeal from these tribal court 
decisions to federal court. The only explicit federal remedy under ICRA is habeas 
corpus. 
66. See id. at 71.
67. See Francine R. Skenandore, Comment, Revisiting Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez: Feminist Perspectives on Tribal Sovereignty, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 347, 347 
(2002) (“For practitioners, scholars, and students of federal Indian law, Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez is the most frequently cited case for upholding tribal 
13
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women.68 In fact, even in the Court’s decision, it is clear that the 
justices viewed this case as a conflict between women’s rights and 
tribal rights.69 As the Court noted, recognizing Martinez’s claim for 
injunctive relief would protect her individual rights, but it “would be 
at odds with the congressional goal of protecting tribal self-
government.”70 Consequently, the implication of the Santa Clara 
decision was not that the Pueblo’s ordinance was fair, but that unfair 
laws are the price one pays for protecting tribal sovereignty and 
preserving Indian culture and heritage.71 
A. Interpreting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 
A few scholars have suggested that the Pueblo’s claim of a 
patrilineal membership tradition was overstated and the case did not 
truly present a conflict between cultural traditions.72 Nevertheless, 
most commentators accepted the tribe’s description of its patrilineal 
traditions and, like the Court, viewed the case as a disagreement 
sovereignty.”). 
68. See id. The author explains that “[m]ainstream feminists claim that the
Court overlooked the equal protection claim and upheld tribal sovereignty at the 
expense of female equality,” while “Indian feminists view tribal sovereignty from the 
perspective that it is crucial to the cultural survival of Indian women.” Id. 
69. See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62 (“Two distinct and competing purposes are
manifest in the provisions of the ICRA: In addition to its objective of strengthening 
the position of individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe, Congress also intended 
to promote the well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-
government.’” (citation omitted)). 
70. Id. at 64.
71. See id. at 72 (“[W]e are constrained to find that § 1302 does not impliedly
authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its 
officers.”). 
72. For example, Judith Resnik has questioned whether this membership rule
could really have come from the enduring culture of the Santa Clara people when 
it is 
linked to the Pueblo’s decision to organize under the guidance of the 
Department of the Interior, is linked to the Pueblo as a recipient of 
federal funds, and is linked to the Pueblo as situated in a United States 
culture that has made patrilineal and patriarchal rules so familiar that, 
to some, they seem uncontroversial. 
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 671, 725 (1989); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case 
Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 68–69 (1987) (suggesting that the male supremacist ideology of tribes like 
the Santa Clara Pueblo may have been adopted from white culture). 
14
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between two different cultures with very different values.73 Professor 
Gloria Valencia-Webber’s description of the case is illustrative. She 
described Santa Clara as a “conflict between American Indians and 
the mainstream non-Indian world about what values should guide 
when law is made for a society.”74 According to Valencia-Webber, the 
case revealed the “chasm between two cultural frameworks.”75 
Consequently, the conflict in Santa Clara is not over whether Indian 
and non-Indian values were in conflict but, instead, whether the 
preservation of the tribe’s sovereign right to continue its patrilineal 
tradition was worth sacrificing the American value of gender 
equality. 
Rina Swentzell, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo and an 
expert on Santa Clara culture, believed tribal sovereignty was worth 
this sacrifice.76 In a moving essay on the Santa Clara case, Swentzell 
explained that despite the fact she believed the decision was bad for 
her individually, she ultimately supported it because she considered 
it good for the tribe.77 She stated, 
I thought long and hard about the Martinez case. I wanted 
my children to be members of Santa Clara, although I had 
married a non-Indian who I met in college. If the case 
favored the Martinez family, who I assumed had been 
encouraged by non-Native people to initiate the lawsuit, I 
73. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Inequality: Old and New Strains and
American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 335 (2004) (“Indian law cases such as 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez clearly expose the tension between constitutional 
individual rights conceived in an abstract sense and the tribe’s right as a cultural 
and political community with distinct consensual values.”); see also supra note 68 and 
accompanying text (showing the difference in opinion between “mainstream” and 
“Indian” feminists). 
74. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Three Stories in One: The Story of Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 451 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).
75. Id.; see also Skenandore, supra note 67, at 368 (“Santa Clara is a very difficult
case to reconcile from both a sovereignty perspective and an equal rights 
perspective. Ultimately, the two positions cannot be reconciled.”); Rebecca Tsosie, 
Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 508–09 (1994) (describing 
the debate between those who privilege individual rights over tribal sovereignty and 
vice versa). 
76. See Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 97, 97 (2004) (“I wanted the courts to rule in favor of the tribe—to rule for 
tribal sovereignty . . . . I also knew that it did not make sense; that it was not just or 
fair.”). 
77. Id. at 98–99.
15
Zug: Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
776 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:4 
felt that Santa Clara would loose [sic] any remnants of itself 
as a vital, self-determining community. I was relieved to 
hear the decision. Santa Clara was to retain the on-going 
conversation about who is a recognized member of the 
community. But, more importantly, the Western world was 
acknowledging the way of life which traditionally honored 
nurturing and feminine qualities.78 
Swentzell supported the decision because she believed it was 
good for the Tribe, but many other commentators were unwilling to 
accept the idea that the preservation of tribal sovereignty and tribal 
traditions could justify discrimination against American Indian 
women.79 For instance, in her excoriating critique of the Santa Clara 
decision, Professor Catharine MacKinnon wrote, “[C]ultural survival 
is as contingent on equality between women and men as it is upon 
equality between people.”80 She therefore questions whether a 
culture based on gender inequality is one capable of long-term 
survival.81 
As MacKinnon’s quote demonstrates, the Santa Clara decision 
affirmed the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, but it did so by 
reinforcing the perception that tribal sovereignty permits the 
perpetuation of backwards and inferior values. Moreover, although 
Santa Clara was not the first case to portray a conflict between Indian 
sovereignty and American values, it was the first to do so after the 
passage of ICRA, which many supporters had hoped would eliminate 
these types of cultural conflicts.82 It did not. As the Santa Clara 
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Carla Christofferson, Tribal Courts’ Failure to Protect Native American
Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 185 (1991) 
(“The Santa Clara decision showed great respect for the sovereignty of Native 
American tribes. Yet in awarding such unrestricted sovereignty, the Court has left 
Native American women powerless within their communities. . . . In light of the 
current plight of Native American women, an expansion of the ICRA is warranted. 
Congress has a duty to provide an enforcement mechanism for the rights 
enumerated in the ICRA.”). See generally Ann E. Tweedy, Sex Discrimination Under 
Tribal Law, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 392 (2010) (discussing ways different Native 
American tribes respond to gender discrimination cases). 
80. MACKINNON, supra note 72, at 68.
81. Id. at 65.
82. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1705 (2012);
David M. Schraver & David H. Tennant, Indian Tribal Sovereignty—Current Issues, 75 
ALB. L. REV. 133, 144 (2011–2012) (noting that “ICRA was prompted by complaints 
about civil rights violations by Indian tribes”); Hayley Weedn, Stay Out of the Cookie 
Jar: Revisiting Martinez to Explain Why the U.S. Should Keep Its Hands Out of Tribal 
16
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decision demonstrated, ICRA could not force tribes to discard 
controversial customs and traditions. This decision was a blow to the 
Act’s supporters, but a bigger blow was still to come.83 Santa Clara 
paved the way for the Cherokee Freedmen cases, a set of cases that 
seemed to confirm Santa Clara’s critics’ worst fears regarding Indian 
sovereignty and injustice.84 
B. The Cherokee Freedmen 
The Cherokee Freedmen are the descendants of former 
Cherokee slaves.85 In 1866, a treaty between the Cherokee Nation 
and the United States freed these men and women and granted 
them the rights and privileges of Cherokee citizenship.86 Despite this 
treaty promise, the Freedmen were routinely and systematically 
excluded from participation in tribal affairs, and, over time, this 
exclusion became increasingly pronounced.87 By the late 1970s, the 
Freedmen had been entirely disenfranchised and denied their 
citizenship rights.88 
Constitutionalism and Internal Self-Governance, 20 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 
18, 38 (2012) (“[ICRA] was initially prompted due to ‘[c]omplaints received by the 
[Senate S]ubcommittee [on Constitutional Rights] alleging that Indians were being 
deprived of their rights by Federal, State, and tribal governments.’ Congress was 
thus persuaded that the gap in application of some of the most fundamental of U.S. 
constitutional values between tribal members and tribal governments left Natives 
particularly vulnerable to abuses.”). 
83. See Skenandore, supra note 67, at 368 (noting that in response to the
decision, “equal rights supporters propose to amend the ICRA as a means of 
protecting the equal rights of Julia Martinez and other women within their tribes”); 
see also Christofferson, supra note 79, at 170 (arguing “that an expansion of the ICRA 
is necessary to protect Native American women from discriminatory actions by their 
tribes”). 
84. See Circe Sturm, Race, Sovereignty, and Civil Rights: Understanding the Cherokee
Freedmen Controversy, 29 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 575 (2014), 
https://culanth.org/articles/751-race-sovereignty-and-civil-rights-understanding 
(discussing the Cherokee Freedmen). 
85. S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of
Freedmen’s Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 387 (2007); see also Lolita Buckner 
Inniss, Cherokee Freedmen and the Color of Belonging, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 100, 114–17 
(2015), http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/844. 
86. Ray, supra note 85, at 390.
87. See Sturm, supra note 84, at 576 (“Whether or not they have Cherokee
ancestry, Cherokee Freedmen have encountered intense opposition whenever they 
have sought the full rights and benefits given other tribal citizens.”). 
88. The story of the disenfranchisement of the Freemen can be summarized as
follows: 
17
Zug: Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
778 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:4 
The disenfranchisement of the Freedmen occurred when the 
Cherokee tribal council changed the Tribe’s membership criteria.89 
Under the new membership rules, all tribal members were required 
to provide a Certificate of Indian Blood Card (CDIB) based on the 
degree of blood listed on the Dawes Rolls (the 1906 list of tribal 
members created by the federal government) for their ancestor.90 
The catch, however, was that the Dawes Rolls did not list a degree of 
blood for Freedmen tribal members.91 Consequently, this new rule 
[T]he Cherokee Nation reorganized its government between 1970 and 
1976 . . . . During that period, the Freedmen were quietly 
disenfranchised and denied their right to citizenship. . . . These changes 
occurred without the knowledge or input of the Cherokee Freedmen. 
When the Reverend Roger Nero and his companions went to vote in the 
Cherokee elections in 1983, they found that the definition of a Cherokee 
citizen had been changed to exclude them, which came as a surprise 
since Nero had voted in the last tribal election in 1979.  
CIRCE DAWN STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE
NATION OF OKLAHOMA 179–80 (2002). 
89. See Ray, supra note 85, at 411–12 (“The introduction of this requirement—
possession of a federally-issued [Certificate of Indian Blood Card]—into the formal 
criteria for Cherokee Nation citizenship in 1977–78 marked the first time since the 
Treaty of 1866 that the Nation had officially predicated citizenship on biology. . . . 
The Dawes Rolls were effectively attenuated to ‘Indian blood’- based categories only, 
and in subsequent elections, Freedmen’s descendants were turned back from the 
polls.”). 
90. Id.; see also Steve Russell, A Black and White Issue: The Invisibility of American
Indians in Racial Policy Discourse, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 129, 132 (1999); Evelyn 
Nieves, Putting to a Vote the Question ‘Who Is Cherokee?,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/us/03cherokee.html. 
91. Carla D. Pratt described the Dawes Rolls as follows:
The freedmen roll listed the names of the tribes’ freed slaves regardless 
of whether they were of Indian ancestry. It also did not record which 
freedmen had Native American blood. Rather, it merely listed their 
names and the tribal affiliation of their former slavemaster. Thus, the 
tribes and the federal government recognized people with Indian and 
European ancestry as Indian and those of Indian and African ancestry 
as Negro. Accordingly, the Dawes Commission was able to complete the 
work of tribal antiblack miscegenation laws: by failing to document the 
freedmen’s Indian ancestry on the rolls, the Dawes Commission created 
the impression that all freedmen lacked Indian blood. Hence, the Dawes 
Rolls create the legal fiction that Indian identity is Africanless. The 
perception of the freedmen as non-Indian is still held today by some 
members of the tribe who mistakenly think that all freedmen were “just 
slaves.” 
Carla D. Pratt, Loving Indian Style: Maintaining Racial Caste and Tribal Sovereignty 
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effectively removed most Freedmen and their descendants from 
tribal membership.92 
In 1984, a group of Freedmen sued the Cherokee tribe, alleging 
that the new membership criteria constituted unconstitutional race 
discrimination.93 The district court dismissed the Freedmen’s claims, 
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision.94 Specifically, the 
appellate court based its decision on Santa Clara, stating, “A tribe’s 
right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been 
recognized as central to its existence as an independent political 
community.”95 Thus, the court concluded that applying ICRA’s 
equal protection provision to a tribe’s designation of its tribal 
members would in effect eviscerate the tribe’s sovereign power to 
define itself and would constitute an unacceptable interference 
“with a tribe’s ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically 
distinct entity.”96 
The fight regarding the Freedmen continued for many years, 
but in 2002, the Cherokee government sought to amend its 
constitution to fully complete the disenfranchisement of the 
Freedmen.97 This move was again challenged by a group of 
Freedmen, and initially, they won.98 In March 2006, the Cherokee 
Supreme Court held the amendment impermissible and declared 
that the Freedmen were entitled to citizenship under the 1975 
Through Sexual Assimilation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 409, 456–57 (2007) (citations 
omitted). 
92. Although the Dawes Rolls did not list blood quantum for the freedmen,
many actually had Indian ancestors. For various racial reasons, mixed-race 
Cherokees were frequently placed on the freedmen rolls rather than the Indian 
rolls. See Alex Kellogg, Cherokee Nation Faces Scrutiny for Expelling Blacks, NPR (Sept. 
19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/19/140594124/u-s-government-opposes 
-cherokee-nations-decision (noting that “blacks—even those who were part 
Indian—were simply labeled as black on the Dawes Rolls”). 
93. See Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1458–59 (10th Cir. 1989).
94. See id. at 1460–61 (confirming that Santa Clara provides the tribes with
immunity from suit for violations of ICRA). 
95. Id. at 1463 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32
(1978)). 
96. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 72.
97. Jon Velie, Should the United States Be Fighting for Jim Crow’s Survival by Its
Complicity in Denying Voting Rights to the Cherokee Freedmen?, 54 FED. LAW. 43, 44 (2007). 
98. See Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, No. JAT-04-09, at 3 (Cherokee
Nation Jud. App. Trib. Mar. 7, 2006), 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/allen-v-cherokee-nation.pdf. 
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constitution.99 Many Cherokee members were unhappy with this 
decision, and a constitutional referendum was called to address the 
issue.100 An overwhelming majority of voters then voted to amend 
the Cherokee constitution to limit tribal membership to persons 
with documented Cherokee ancestry.101 In 2011, the Cherokee 
Nation Supreme Court upheld the referendum results.102 
Like Santa Clara, the Cherokee Freedmen cases were viewed as 
a conflict between Indian and non-Indian values.103 The Cherokee 
argued that, as a sovereign nation, it had the right to define its 
membership and to do so in accordance with traditional Cherokee 
values that emphasized the importance of ancestry and clan.104 
However, critics of the Nation’s disenfranchisement decision saw it 
as an atrocious civil rights violation that defied the core American 
constitutional values of equality and fairness.105 Consequently, 
although the courts in the Freedmen cases held that the principle of 
99. Ray, supra note 85, at 388 (citing Allen, No. JAT-04-09, at 19).
 100. Jessica Jones, Cherokee by Blood and the Freedmen Debate: The Conflict of Minority 
Group Rights in a Liberal State, 22 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 19 (2009). 
101. Id. 
 102. See Cherokee Nation Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, at 9 (Cherokee 
Nation S. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/sc-11 
-02-15-opinion-cn-registrar-v-nash.pdf; In re 2011 General Election, No. SC-2011-06, 
at 1 (Cherokee Nation S. Ct. July 21, 2011), 
http://www.cherokeecourts.org/Portals/73/Documents/Supreme_Court/SC-11   
-06%2024-FINAL%20ORDER%207-21-11.pdf. Shortly before this article was 
published, a federal district court held that the Cherokee Nation has the right to 
determine its membership, subject to the 1866 Treaty between the federal 
government and the Tribe, which stated that the Cherokee Freedmen are entitled 
to membership in the Tribe. Cherokee Nation v. Nash, No. 13-01313, 2017 WL 
3822870 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2017). The Tribe has decided not to appeal the decision. 
Kat Chow, Judge Rules that Cherokee Freedmen Have Right to Tribal Citizenship, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 31, 2017, 7:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way 
/2017/08/31/547705829/judge-rules-that-cherokee-freedmen-have-right-to-tribal  
-citizenship. 
 103. Rebecca Tsosie, The Next Frontier in Federal Indian Law: Building on the 
Foundational Work of Carole E. Goldberg, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1692, 1732 (2016). 
 104. Will Chavez, Cherokee Judge Rules for Freedmen in Citizenship Case, CHEROKEE
PHX. (Jan. 14, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20110118004854/http:// 
www.cherokeephoenix.org/25490/Article.aspx (quoting the Cherokee Nation 
Attorney General as saying that “[w]e believe that the Cherokee people can change 
our Constitution, and that the Cherokee citizenry clearly and lawfully enunciated 
their intentions to do so in the 2007 amendment”). 
 105. See Tsosie, supra note 103, at 1731 (discussing how the Congressional Black 
Caucus called for Congress to terminate the Cherokee Nation’s trust). 
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tribal sovereignty prevented them from interfering with and 
directing tribal membership decisions, others—most notably the 
other branches federal government—were not nearly so sanguine 
about the Tribe’s actions.106 In fact, in this case, the federal 
government’s response demonstrated an outright refusal to respect 
tribal sovereignty.107 
After the Cherokee Supreme Court issued its decision 
upholding the amendment expelling the Freedmen, Larry Echo 
Hawk, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs for the U.S. Department 
of the Interior, issued a menacing letter to the Cherokee 
government.108 He wrote that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
“had never approved the constitutional amendment removing the 
Freedmen and would consider the 2011 Cherokee election 
unconstitutional if the Freedmen were prevented from voting.”109 
He thus warned the Tribe to “consider carefully the Nation’s next 
steps in proceeding with an election that does not comply with 
federal law.”110 
Echo Hawk’s letter was an unapologetic threat to Cherokee 
tribal sovereignty and an announcement that the federal 
government considered the Cherokee people unable to govern 
themselves.111 It was also not the only government threat the Tribe 
received.112 Ten days earlier, the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) froze thirty-three million dollars of 
housing funds, which it stated would only be restored to the Tribe 
once “the [Freedmen] issue is resolved.”113 In addition, the 
106. See Echo Hawk, supra note 37. 
107. See id. 
108. Id. 
109. Cody McBride, Placing a Limiting Principle on Federal Monetary Influences of 
Tribes, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 387, 408–09 (2015). 
 110. Id. The Echo Hawk letter further stated that “[t]he Department will not 
recognize any action taken by the Nation that is inconsistent with these principles 
and does not accord its Freedmen members full rights of citizenship.” Echo Hawk, 
supra note 37. 
 111. In 1997, federal intervention was needed to remove corrupt tribal leaders. 
At the time, Chad Smith, incumbent chief, called the intervention by federal agents 
“humiliating” and “embarrassing.” Sam Howe Verhovek, Cherokee Nation Facing a 
Crisis Involving Its Tribal Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/06/us/cherokee-nation-facing-a-crisis      
-involving-its-tribal-constitution.html?src=pm. It was a clear sign that the nation 
appeared unable to govern itself. Id. 
112. McBride, supra note 109, at 407–09. 
113. Id. at 408. 
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Cherokee Nation’s membership decision had so disgusted California 
Congresswomen Diane Watson that even before the BIA or HUD got 
involved, Watson introduced a bill to cut off all federal funding for 
the tribe (estimated to be approximately 300 million dollars per 
year) and suspend its ability to conduct gaming operations until full 
citizenship was restored to the Freedmen.114 
Cherokee leaders recognized that these threats posed a grave 
risk to Cherokee sovereignty.115 After Watson introduced her bill, 
incumbent Chief Chad Smith called it “a misguided attempt to 
deliberately harm the Cherokee Nation in retaliation for this 
fundamental principle that is shared by more than 500 other Indian 
tribes.”116 The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) also 
expressed its disapproval of the bill, describing it as akin to earlier 
governmental policies designed to destroy Indian tribes.117 Similarly, 
Echo Hawk’s letter led Acting Principle Chief Joe Crittenden to 
 114. Chris Casteel, Lawmaker Wants to Eliminate Funding for Cherokee Nations, 
NEWSOK (June 22, 2007), http://newsok.com/article/3069097. On June 21, 2007, 
U.S. Representative Diane Watson (D-California), one of the twenty-five 
Congressional Black Caucus members who signed a letter asking the BIA to 
investigate the Freedmen situation, introduced H.R. 2824. This bill sought to sever 
the Cherokee Nation’s federal recognition, strip the Cherokee Nation of its federal 
funding (estimated $300 million annually), and stop the Cherokee Nation’s gaming 
operations if the Tribe did not honor the Treaty of 1866. H.R. 2824 was co-signed 
by eleven Congress members and was referred to the Committee of Natural 
Resources and the Committee of the Judiciary. H.R. 2824, 110th Cong. (2007), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/2824. 
 115. McBride, supra note 109, at 407 (“Facing mounting federal pressure, 
including the loss of a substantial amount of federal funding, the Tribe caved to 
federal demands and agreed to temporarily reinstate the Freedmen as citizens until 
the federal court could reach a final decision.”). 
116. Casteel, supra note 114. 
 117. President Joe Garcia described the bill with reference to the disastrous 
Termination Era. He stated, 
This is an uncalled for response to a question of treaty interpretation. 
When Alabama or California takes an action inconsistent with 
Congressional views, there is no discussion of revoking their statehood. 
The attempt to revoke tribal nationhood is equally inappropriate. Not 
since the Termination Era of the 1950s, when the official policy of the 
federal government was complete destruction of indigenous peoples, 
have we seen such a piece of legislation. NCAI was founded to oppose 
termination of Indian tribes. 
Jerry Reynolds, Freedmen Status at Issue in Washington, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA 
NETWORK (June 29, 2007), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2007/06 
/29/freedmen-status-issue-washington-91054. 
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declare, “The Cherokee Nation will not be governed by the U.S. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.”118 These objections to the threatened 
government interference were valid, but it was also clear that they 
would be ineffective.119 
The Cherokee government agreed to reinstate the Freedmen as 
citizens120 once it became clear that its decision to justify racial 
discrimination as a right of sovereignty wound up threatening that 
very sovereignty.121 As both the Santa Clara and the Cherokee 
Freedmen cases demonstrate, when tribes use sovereignty as the 
justification for discriminatory actions, they jeopardize the future of 
tribal sovereignty. 
IV. TRIBAL TRADITIONS AND FAIRNESS
Tribes have the right to enact same-sex marriage bans, but after 
Obergefell, it is extremely likely that such bans will negatively influence 
non-Indian views of tribal sovereignty. The public response to both 
the Santa Clara Pueblo and the Cherokee Nation’s controversial 
decisions was extremely negative, and those cases only involved a 
single tribe. In contrast, same-sex marriage bans involve many tribes 
and hundreds of thousands of individuals. Unfair or not, non-Indian 
perceptions of tribal justice are critically important for Indian 
sovereignty, and thus, continuing tribal marriage bans has the 
potential to significantly harm Indian tribes. 
 118. Acting Principle Chief Joe Crittenden further added, “We will hold our 
election and continue our long legacy of responsible self-governance.” Jorge Rivas, 
U.S. Government Pressures Cherokee Nation to Accept Descendants of Slaves, COLORLINES 
(Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/us-government-pressures 
-cherokee-nation-accept-descendants-slaves. Because the Cherokee Nation 
Constitution does not allow elected officials to remain in office past Inauguration 
Day, Smith was required to leave office on August 14, 2011. Crittenden was then 
sworn in as deputy chief and elevated to acting principal chief in accordance with 
the constitutional chain of succession. 
119. McBride, supra note 109, at 409. 
120. Id. 
 121. Compare id. (“Facing mounting federal pressure, including the loss of a 
substantial amount of federal funding, the Tribe caved to federal demands and 
agreed to temporarily reinstate the Freedmen as citizens until the federal court 
could reach a final judicial decision.”), with Echo Hawk, supra note 37 (“The 
Department will not recognize any action taken by the Nation that is inconsistent 
with these principles and does not accord its Freedmen members full rights of 
citizenship.”). 
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A. Crow Dog and Tribal Justice 
The United States has a long history of limiting Indian 
sovereignty in response to perceived conflicts between Indian and 
non-Indian customs and traditions.122 In fact, the entire body of 
federal law pertaining to criminal jurisdiction over Indians was 
created as a solution to the perceived problem of traditional tribal 
justice.123 The case that spurred the call for federal assumption of 
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country is Ex parte Crow Dog.124 
However, the sad irony of the Crow Dog case is that many modern 
Americans would now view the Indian justice meted out in Crow Dog 
as fairer and more just than the punishment mandated by 
nineteenth-century federal law.125 
Ex parte Crow Dog involved the murder of one member of the 
Brule Sioux band of the Sioux Nation by another member.126 The 
question for the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the laws of the 
United States governed this crime.127 The Court held they did not.128 
According to the Crow Dog Court, it would be unfair to try an Indian 
plaintiff according to U.S. law because such laws are “opposed to the 
traditions of their history” and “the habits of their lives.”129 
 122. See, e.g., L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the 
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1996) (describing the history of the 
American government in limiting Indian sovereignty). 
 123. E.g., Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority 
over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 926 (2012) (“The 
ethnocentric non-Indian view was that such tribal justice systems were inadequate 
and western notions of criminal punishment should be imposed on tribes, and thus 
the MCA became law.”). 
124. Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 125. There are increasing arguments that the death penalty should be abolished 
and that it violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. See generally JOHN BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH
PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT (2012); DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION (2010); JEFFREY
KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN DEATH
PENALTY (2015); ANDREW WELSH-HUGGINS, NO WINNERS HERE TONIGHT: RACE,
POLITICS, AND GEOGRAPHY IN ONE OF THE COUNTRY’S BUSIEST DEATH PENALTY STATES 
(2009). 
126. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 572. 
129. Id. at 571. 
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Therefore, the Court concluded that it would not “measure[] the 
red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.”130 
As the Court’s explanation suggests, when Crow Dog was decided 
in 1883, there was a widespread perception that Indian and Anglo-
American forms of justice were vastly different.131 The Crow Dog 
Court held that this difference justified exempting Indians from 
federal criminal laws,132 but this was a minority view. By the time Crow 
Dog was decided, most lawmakers believed that the difference 
between Indian and non-Indian forms of justice required the 
imposition of federal criminal law over Indian country.133 
Consequently, shortly after Crow Dog was decided, the Secretary of 
the Interior, Samuel Kirkwood, used the decision to demand 
legislation permitting the federal courts to punish reservation 
crimes.134 He stated, 
If offenses of this character cannot be tried in the courts of 
the United States, there is no tribunal in which the crime 
of murder can be punished. . . . If the murder is left to be 
punished according to the old Indian custom, it becomes 
the duty of the next of kin to avenge the death of his 
relative by either killing the murderer or some one of his 
kinsman.135 
Kirkwood’s statement accused tribal justice of demanding 
indiscriminate revenge killings.136 This was incorrect.137 The 
traditional form of justice the Sioux used to deal with murder was 
restitution.138 Nevertheless, by portraying tribal justice as random, 
130. Id. 
 131. See Raymond I. Orr, Liberal Defaults: The Pending Perception of “Special 
Financial Rights” Among American Indian Nations, 47 TULSA L. REV. 515, 524 (2012) 
(discussing how Congress passed the Major Crimes Act to apply uniformity in tribal 
law after Ex parte Crow Dog). 
132. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572. 
133. See Orr, supra note 131, at 523 (discussing the strong public outcry after 
Crow Dog). 
 134. 1884 COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR 9. 
135. Id. 
 136. Id. (“If the murder is left to be punished according to the old Indian 
custom, it becomes the duty of the next of kin to avenge the death of his relative by 
either killing the murderer or some one of his kinsmen.”). 
137. See Matthew Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against Tribal 
Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 96 (2007) (“[Crow Dog] was punished 
according to Lakota custom and tradition.”). 
138. See, e.g., id. at 96 (discussing that after a tribal council meeting and 
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bloodthirsty, barbaric, and unfair, the government was able to depict 
it as inferior to the American criminal justice system.139 However, it 
was actually federal law, not tribal law, that was premised on 
revenge.140 Unlike tribal law, which required restitution to the 
murder victim’s family, federal law demanded the perpetrator’s 
death.141 Unfortunately, the veracity of the government’s revenge 
claims did not matter. The fabricated difference between Indian and 
non-Indian justice was accepted and then used to justify extending 
federal criminal law over Indian country.142 Shortly after the Crow 
Dog decision, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act and gave federal 
courts the power to punish murder and other serious crimes that 
occurred in Indian country.143 
Although Crow Dog is an old case, the arguments it inspired, 
namely that Indian justice is different and inferior to non-Indian 
justice, have not disappeared.144 Every time a tribal government 
enacts laws that conflict with fundamental American law principles, 
there is the danger of reinforcing this perception.145 This does not 
mean that tribal courts and legislatures should parrot federal law, 
but it does mean that visible and controversial conflicts with federal 
law cannot be considered purely tribal affairs. A tribe’s decision to 
prefer male members, expel black members, or ban marriage 
between LGBT members strongly influences how non-Indians view 
mediation, Crow Dog was ordered to pay $600, eight horses, and one blanket to 
Spotted Tail’s people). 
 139. See id. at 96–97 (“Non-Indians, fueled by local Indian agents, were enraged 
by what they viewed as a lack of punishment.”). 
 140. Compare id. at 96 (the Tribal community punished Crow Dog by requiring 
him to pay restitution to the victim’s family), with Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow 
Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883) (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 
(Section 3 of that Act)) (“[E]very person who commits murder . . . within any fort, 
arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall suffer death.”). 
141. Id. at 96. 
 142. Id. at 97 (describing how Congress’s reaction to Crow Dog was to extend 
federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country). 
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. IV 1998). 
144. E.g., infra Sections IV.B.1–2 (discussing the arguments put forth by 
Petitioners in the Dollar General case that tribal courts are unsophisticated and 
founded on traditions, custom, and bias). 
 145. Brief for Respondent, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 
136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL 6083240, at *18 (“In the end, 
petitioner’s argument is predicated on the baseless assertion that tribal courts are 
unfit for nonmembers.”). 
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tribal justice, and the recent Dollar General case demonstrates how 
these views continue to threaten tribal sovereignty.146 
B. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Dollar General Corp. 
On June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its judgment in 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Dollar General Corp.147 The Court 
split 4-4, and the lower court’s decision was affirmed.148 This was the 
narrowest of wins for the tribe, and, because there was no majority 
decision, it does not eliminate the possibility of similar challenges in 
the future.149 As the Dollar General case demonstrates, claims 
regarding tribal injustice remain a powerful litigation strategy both 
for organizations and individuals seeking to avoid tribal court 
jurisdiction.150 
Dollar General involved a sexual assault against a minor that was 
allegedly perpetrated by a non-Indian employee of a Dollar General 
store located in Indian country.151 This was a criminal assault, and it 
should have led to criminal charges.152 Nevertheless, Dollar General 
was filed as a civil suit and was only filed after it became clear there 
would be no criminal prosecution of the non-Indian perpetrator.153 
 146. See generally infra Sections IV.B.1–2 (discussing the arguments put forth by 
Petitioners in the Dollar General case). 
147. 136 S. Ct. 2159. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. See generally Aaron F. Arnold et al., State and Tribal Courts: Strategies for 
Bridging the Divide, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 801, 816–18 (2012). 
 151. Dolgen Corp., Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 4:08-CV-22TSL-
JCS, 2008 WL 5381906, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2008), disapproved in later proceedings 
sub nom. Dolgencorp Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 846 F. Supp. 2d 646 
(S.D. Miss. 2011), aff’d, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Dollar Gen. Corp. 
v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159.
152. But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding
that tribes do not have inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (reaching the 
same conclusion as Oliphant). Thus, because the Tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction 
over the alleged perpetrator—a non-Indian—it was the responsibility of the federal 
government to prosecute, which it failed to do. See Ned Blackhawk, The Struggle for 
Justice on Tribal Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/opinion/the-struggle-for-justice-on-tribal  -lands.html. 
153. Dolgen, 2008 WL 5381906, at *1. 
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Sadly, this sequence of events is not unique.154 Most sexual assaults 
in Indian country are never prosecuted.155 
There are two reasons for the lack of criminal prosecution in 
Indian country. The first stems from the 1978 case Oliphant v. 
Squamish Indian Tribe,156 in which the Supreme Court held that tribes 
have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.157 Pursuant to 
Oliphant, only the federal government can prosecute non-Indians for 
crimes committed in Indian country, and in Dollar General, as in the 
majority of Indian sexual assault cases, the federal government 
declined to prosecute.158 
Once it appeared that the sexual assault would go unpunished, 
the child and his family brought a civil suit against Dollar General in 
tribal court.159 Dollar General objected.160 It argued that the Tribe 
did not have jurisdiction over it, but the lower courts disagreed and 
ruled for the Tribe.161 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari 
to address the question of a tribe’s right to assert civil jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.162 
In its Supreme Court briefs, Dollar General had two primary 
arguments for why tribal courts should not be able to assert 
154. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE 63 (2006), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeofinjustice.pdf (“[F]indings indicate that 
federal prosecutors frequently decline to pursue cases of sexual violence against 
Native American women.”). 
 155. Id. at 62 (“The lack of comprehensive and centralized data collection by 
tribal, state and federal agencies renders it impossible to obtain accurate 
information about prosecution rates. However, survivors of sexual abuse, activists, 
support workers and officials reported that prosecutions for crimes of sexual 
violence against Indigenous women are rare in federal, state and tribal courts.”) 
156. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 157. Id. at 210–12. This case was the culmination of efforts that began with Ex 
parte Crow Dog to strip Indian tribes of criminal jurisdiction. 
158. See Louise Erdrich, Rape on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013) 
(noting that “[m]ore than 80 percent of sex crimes on reservations are committed 
by non-Indian men, who are immune from prosecution by tribal courts,” and that 
“federal prosecutors decline to prosecute 67 percent of sexual abuse cases”). 
 159. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th 
Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. 
Ct. 2159 (2016). 
160. Id. 
 161. Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (affirming lower courts’ judgments that the 
tribal court has jurisdiction over Doe’s claims). 
162. Id. 
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jurisdiction over non-Indians.163 First, it argued that since tribal 
courts lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, they are similarly 
barred from exercising civil jurisdiction; and second, knowingly 
consenting to tribal regulation is impossible because that would 
require a jury to decide the Tribe’s unwritten tort law.164 Dollar 
General attempted to support these positions by arguing that tribal 
courts are unsophisticated compared to state and federal courts and 
that they are inherently unjust.165 Paraphrasing Dollar General’s 
argument, The Atlantic journalist Garrett Epps wrote that the 
company argued that tribes “are poorly organized and badly run; 
lack independence from tribal governments; don’t respect 
constitutional rights; and enforce ‘tribal law, custom, and traditions’ 
rather than actual law. They aren’t really courts at all.”166 In the same 
article, Epps also quoted Brendan Johnson, a former U.S. attorney 
and experienced Indian-law litigator, who explained that “the 
premise of Dollar General’s case is that tribal courts are inherently 
incompetent and biased against non-members.”167 
1. Unsophisticated Tribal Courts
Dollar General’s argument regarding the unsophistication of 
tribal courts was based on outdated and misleading information. 
The company began this section of its brief by noting that “few 
Indian tribes had operating judicial systems in place in the late 
1970’s.”168 It then used this statement to imply that little had 
changed.169 However, much has changed. The state of tribal justice 
systems in the 1970s has little bearing on the sophistication of 
modern tribal justice systems.170 In the 1990s, Congress approved 
 163. See Brief for Petitioners, Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL 
5169095, at *16–19. 
164. Id. 
165. See infra pages 44–52 and accompanying notes. 




 168. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 163, at *2 (citing Court of Indian Offenses, 
U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, INDIAN AFF., https://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre 
/RegionalOffices/SouthernPlains/WeAre/ciospr/index.htm). 
169. Id. at *2–3. 
170. The Petitioners’ brief cites also a 2002 statistic showing that only 
approximately 60% of tribes had such court systems. Id. However, this argument is 
a red herring and an attempt to distract from the actual issue in the case—the 
29
Zug: Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
790 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:4 
billions of dollars in funding to improve and enhance tribal law 
enforcement and court systems.171 Consequently, over the past thirty 
years, there has been a rapid increase in the construction of new 
tribal courthouses and jails, as well as significant investments in 
technology, communications, and public safety programs.172 In 
addition, hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funding was 
approved to train tribal court judges, lawyers, paralegals, and other 
courthouse personnel.173 
The implication of Dollar General’s general attack on tribal 
justice systems is that tribes should be treated as monolithic and that 
the weakness of one tribal court should be considered a failing of 
them all. This argument is wrong. Regardless of the state of tribal 
justice systems in general, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians’ 
justice system is one of the most sophisticated and successful tribal 
jurisdiction of the Choctaw Tribal Court, which is a well-established and highly 
respected tribal court. Whether other tribes have less sophisticated courts is 
irrelevant and was mentioned by Dollar General solely to cast doubt on the fairness 
of tribal justice in general. As the brief of amici Cherokee Nation et al. noted, 
Much of the States’ argument against tribal jurisdiction here rests on a 
sweeping indictment of all tribal judicial systems. With strikingly few 
citations, the States broadly condemn tribal courts as biased and lacking 
independence, and tribal law as mysterious, in- accessible, and indeed 
all but incoherent. Based on this far-reaching attack, the States—despite 
asserting that “tribal court systems vary wildly,” and contrary to their 
argument that “[t]his Court should not impose a one-size-fits-all rule”—
urge the Court to deprive every tribal court in the country of jurisdiction 
over civil tort claims like the one asserted here. 
Brief for the Cherokee Nation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-
1496), 2015 WL 6445772, at *16. 
 171. Indian Self Determination and Educational Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975). This program was highly successful. See Brief for the 
Cherokee Nation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 170, 
at *26 (explaining that many tribal courts are sophisticated and “closely resemble 
federal and state courts,” as “[t]hey are established by (publicly available) 
constitutions and laws; their structure, personnel, and procedures are set by 
(publicly available) tribal laws; they apply published tribal statutes and the common 
law to decide disputes; and their decisions are publicly available, including on the 
Internet”). 
 172. Suzette Brewer, Tribal Justice on Trial: Dollar General Part II, INDIAN COUNTRY
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justice systems in the country.174 In 2012, the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court judges recognized the Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw court as a model court.175 Similarly, John Echohawk, co-
founder of the Native American Rights Funds, singled out the 
Mississippi Choctaw court for special recognition, noting “Many 
tribal courts across the country, including the Mississippi Choctaw, 
have some of the best, most experienced litigators and legal 
practitioners in the country.”176 Dollar General’s arguments about 
the unsophistication of tribal courts were therefore particularly 
inapplicable to the Mississippi Choctaw. 
The company’s attack on tribal courts ignored the decades of 
improvements that many tribes have undergone and the fact that 
many tribes now have courts that are notably more sophisticated 
than their surrounding state and county courts.177 It is extremely 
telling that the same report Dollar General cited to demonstrate the 
unsophistication of tribal courts also described the weaknesses of 
many state courts.178 In fact, this study included the astounding 
statistic that “more than 40% of the magistrates in Alaska’s state 
courts ‘are not law trained.’”179 This statistic is shocking, yet Dollar 
 174. Another is the Navajo justice system, which adjudicates nearly 75,000 cases 
a year in its tribal court system. Id. 
 175. According to Indian Country Media Network, the organization praised the 
Tribe for its “brand new, state-of-the-art justice complex” and its ability to handle 
“all manner of criminal, civil, youth, and peacemaking courts.” Id. In addition, the 
Tribe’s three-member Supreme Court includes Edwin R. Smith, “a battle hardened 
Mississippi lawyer who is no stranger to the U.S. Supreme Court.” Id. Smith 
represented the Tribe in two pivotal Indian law cases, United States v. Smith John and 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. Id.; see also, Lee Romnet, Tribal Judge 
Works for Yurok-Style Justice, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.latimes.com 
/local/la-me-yurok-tribal-judge-20140305-dto-htmlstory.html (profiling Abby 
Abinanti, Chief Judge of the Yurok Tribe and San Francisco Superior Court 
Commissioner). 
 176. Brewer, supra note 172 (describing how “tribal tribunals are as 
sophisticated as any municipal court in Arizona in terms of how they operate.”). 
 177. E.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 32 n.13, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 
(2016) (No. 13-1496). 
178. NEIL NESHEIM, INST FOR COURT MGMT., EVALUATING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN
ALASKA: THE KAKE CIRCLE 7 (2010), 
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/famct/id/293 
(arguing that the “North American criminal justice system is broken”). 
179. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 177, at 32 n.13. 
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General suggests that even these courts are preferable to a tribal 
court. 
Dollar General attempted to support its position by arguing that 
“the lack of judicial training and independence, the risk of local bias 
and the limited protections against it, etc.” are “the features of tribal 
courts that risk unfair treatment of outsiders.”180 However, simply 
declaring tribes to be biased does not make it true. In fact, studies 
on the subject of tribal bias have demonstrated tribal court 
impartiality. For example, in her 2005 article, Tribal Justice and the 
Outsider, Professor Bethany Berger examined Navajo appellate 
decisions involving disputes between Navajos and non-Navajos and 
found that they were closely balanced. According to Berger, non-
Navajos won 47.4% and lost 52.6% of the cases in which they 
appeared before the tribal court from 1969 to 2004.181 As Berger’s 
study indicates, Indians and non-Indians have a nearly equal chance 
of winning in tribal court.182 
Unfortunately, the perception of unfairness raised in the Dollar 
General’s briefs was not simply an accusation of bias against non-
Indians; it was also the claim that simply subjecting non-Indians to 
Indian customs and traditions is itself unfair.183 This was Dollar 
General’s second argument, and the one that, because it is based 
more on perception than facts, is much more difficult to refute. 
2. Traditions, Customs, and Bias
Dollar General’s second criticism of tribal courts was that they 
are unfair to non-Indian defendants.184 The company argued that 
non-Indian defendants are not likely to be familiar with tribal 
customs.185 Additionally, it argued that even if non-Indians were 
180. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 163, at *54. 
 181. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in 
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1047, 1075–76 (2005) (noting that this rate was 
“consistent across . . . various kinds of disputes,” “[w]hether the issue is child 
custody, torts, contracts, or employment”). 
182. Id. at 1075. 
183. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 163, at *38 (“Subjecting nonmembers 
to civil claims for punitive and other damages by a sovereign operating within the 
boundaries of the United States but existing outside of the constitutional structure 
is . . . inconsistent with the constitutional plan.”). 
 184. Id. at *8 (“Nonmembers’ status as outsiders thus can give rise to a 
substantial risk of unfair treatment.”). 
 185. See id. at *6–7 (explaining that “the content of tribal law is often knowable 
only to a few tribe members”); see also id. at *39 (highlighting that because tribal 
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familiar with such customs, they should still not apply because Indian 
customs and traditions are manifestly unfair when applied to non-
members.186 It is this belief that formed the crux of the company’s 
criticism of tribal justice.187 
In the section of its brief titled “Background on Tribal Courts,” 
Dollar General argued that the primary danger of tribal court 
jurisdiction was the use of custom and tradition.188 The company 
noted that traditional tribal methods of dispute resolution “differed 
substantially from state and federal legal systems.”189 It then added 
that many modern tribes continued to “require their courts to apply 
tribal law, custom, and traditions.”190 Later in the brief, the company 
further emphasized the role of tradition when it stated that “forty 
percent [of tribes] had some unpublished tribal laws or customs 
applying to non-Indians.”191 
Tribal custom and tradition were repeatedly invoked 
throughout Dollar General’s brief as a kind of boogeyman to be 
feared.192 In fact, the words “tradition” and “custom”—or their 
derivatives—are mentioned eighteen times in the brief.193 For 
example, Dollar General stated, “In both civil and criminal cases, 
tribal courts ‘are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and 
usages of the tribes they serve.’”194 It then cited an earlier Supreme 
Court case, Plains Commerce, and the “‘novel’ legal rule applied by 
[the] tribal court based on ‘Lakota tradition . . . and custom.’”195 
Later, Dollar General noted that “these differences can be a point of 
pride among . . . tribes, reflecting each tribe’s ‘unique customs, 
languages, and usages,’” but emphasized that the differences create 
courts “are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes 
they serve,” authority should not extend over those who have not given consent). 
186. See id. at *36–40. 
 187. See id. (noting that in the past the Supreme Court has held “that tribal 
courts . . . [that] have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers would raise serious 
constitutional questions”). 
188. See id. at *6–9. 
189. Id. at *3. 
190. Id. at *6. 
191. Id. at *7. 
192. See, e.g., id. at *6 (“Numerous tribes, including the Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians, require their courts to apply tribal law, custom, and traditions, 
looking to state law only to fill in gaps in tribal law.”). 
193. Id. passim. 
194. Id. at *39 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990)). 
195. Id. at *53 (quoting Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle 
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 338 (2008)). 
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unfairness for non-Indians because “it is often impossible for a 
business to discern the content of all the . . . tribal traditions 
potentially applicable to its relationship with tribal employees and 
customers.”196 Then, to emphasize this point even further, Dollar 
General wrote, 
Like other tribes, the Choctaw contemplate that even tribal 
judges may be ignorant of the law they must apply in all its 
relevant details, providing that, when “doubt arises as to the 
customs and usages of the Tribe, the court may request the 
advice of persons generally recognized in the community 
as being familiar with such customs and usages.”197 
Dollar General’s reference to strange and unfair tribal customs 
is a red herring. As the federal government noted in its amicus brief 
in support of the Tribe, “Here, in particular, there is no suggestion 
that proving a breach of duty to refrain from sexual molestation 
would require resort to ‘unique customs, languages, and usages’ of 
the Tribe.”198 Prohibiting child molestation is not some “strange” 
Indian custom.199 It is a core tenet of American criminal law, and 
consequently, Dollar General’s arguments regarding the dangers of 
tribal traditions and customs in this context should have appeared 
absurd. The fact that they did not is both illuminating and 
disheartening. Concern regarding tribal customs and traditions 
remained so great that Dollar General believed these fears could 
even outweigh the strong desire to protect children from sexual 
predators. 
196. Id. 
 197. Id. (quoting Choctaw Tribal Code § 1-1-4). The amici brief of the states of 
Oklahoma, Wyoming, and South Dakota raised similar concerns, stating that 
“[w]here important rules of decision reside in tribal customs as communicated by 
tribal elders, even if judges are independent, the really important decisions on tribal 
law may be made by tribal elders with no obligations of independence.” Brief 
Amicus Curiae of the States of Oklahoma, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 10–11, 
Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of the Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 
13-1496). 
198. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
supra note 177, at 22. 
 199. See generally PAT SEKAQUAPTEWA ET AL., A VICTIM-CENTERED APPROACH TO
CRIMES AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN (2008) (providing 
an overview of tribal laws and underlying policies impacting the well-being of 
children, including the prohibition of child molestation). 
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C. The Indian Child Welfare Act 
Dollar General’s arguments focused on the potential danger of 
imposing Indian traditions on non-Indians. However, it has typically 
been the converse—the imposition of non-Indian customs and 
values on tribal members—that has caused the most significant 
harm.200 For decades, Indian children were removed from their 
families and placed in Indian boarding schools and adoptive homes 
because Anglo-American society deemed Indian culture and 
customs backwards and harmful.201 In 1978, Congress enacted the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)202 in an attempt to finally protect 
Indian families from courts and state agencies seeking to impose 
western values and traditions on Indian families.203 
ICWA has often been called the most important piece of Indian 
law ever passed;204 yet its ability to overcome non-Indian biases 
against Indian culture and customs has been minimal. Thirty-seven 
 200. Id. at 10 (explaining that forced boarding school policies separating native 
children from their tribal customs left many children “victims of child physical, 
sexual, torture and/or emotional abuse” and those “victims . . . were largely left 
untreated and many were at risk for poor parenting, drug and alcohol abuse, mental 
health issues, relationship and health challenges”). 
 201. See Ann Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and Its Continuing 
Impact on Tribal Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L. REV. 149, 
149 (2007) (explaining that boarding school policies were an “attempt [by] the 
federal government to eradicate the language and culture of American Indians in 
an attempt to turn them into a white man with different colored skin”); see also 
SEKAQUAPTEWA, supra note 199, at 10 (“Forced boarding school policies in the late 
1880’s separated Native children from their families and communities and placed 
them at great risk in unfamiliar institutional settings.”). 
202. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (1978). 
 203. See id. In addition, Dollar General is not the only recent case to make this 
argument. In FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-bannock Tribes, No. 4:14-CV-489-BLW, 2015 WL 
6958066, at *2 (D. Idaho Nov. 9, 2015), FMC argued that the tribal court process 
was biased and that the two judges hearing its case were also biased. 
204. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Fort & Peter S. Vicaire, The Invisible Families: Child Welfare 
and American Indian Active Duty Servicemembers and Veterans, FED. LAW., at 1 (Apr. 15, 
2015) (describing ICWA as “one of the most important pieces of federal legislation 
for American Indian families”); Sheri L. Hazeltine, Speedy Termination of Alaska 
Native Parental Rights: The 1998 Changes to Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid Statutes and 
Their Inherent Conflict with the Mandates of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 19 ALASKA 
L. REV. 57, 59 (2002) (calling ICWA “one of the most important and far-reaching 
pieces of legislation protecting Indian tribes”); Alex T. Skibine, Indian Gaming and 
Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 284–85 (2010) (referring to ICWA as 
“perhaps the most important legislation enacted during this [self-determination] 
era”). 
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years after ICWA, Indian children are still routinely removed from 
their Indian families.205 As recently as 2015, South Dakota was held 
to have violated ICWA by disproportionately removing Indian 
children from their families and placing them in white homes.206 In 
one particularly telling example, South Dakota Judge Jeff Davis was 
found to have removed Indian children from their families one 
hundred percent of the time.207 Matthew Newman, an attorney at the 
Native American Rights Fund, stated, “We’re often finding states 
inventing any reason under the sun . . . not to place [the] child with 
[his or her] family.”208 
In response to these high rates of non-compliance, the BIA 
recently passed new regulations to guide state courts and private and 
public agencies on the implementation of ICWA.209 One of the most 
important goals of these new regulations is to limit what can be 
considered “good cause” for placing Indian children in non-Indian 
homes.210 Indian advocates hope these new regulations will help 
keep Indian children with their families and tribes and counteract 
the extreme biases against Indian customs and traditions that made 
ICWA necessary in the first place.211 
 205. Stephen Pevar, Why Are These Indian Children Being Torn Away from Their 
Homes?, ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (July 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/why-are 
-these-indian-children-being-torn-away-their-homes (“Congress passed the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978 in an effort to stop American Indian families 
from having their children removed by state and local officials for invalid and 
sometimes even racist reasons. Yet 36 years later, Indian children in South Dakota 
are 11 times more likely to be removed from their families and placed in foster care 
than non-Indian children.”). 
 206. Laura Sullivan, Native American Tribes Win Child Welfare Case in South Dakota, 
NPR (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/31/396636927/native 
-american-tribes-win-child-welfare-case-in-south-dakota (noting that in South 
Dakota, “[m]ore than 80 percent of native children are placed in white foster 
homes” and that “[o]ne of the biggest complaints of native families who lost 
children is that they were never allowed to present their side”). 
207. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (D.S.D. 2015). 
 208. Casey Tolan, A Series of New Lawsuits Is Challenging How Native American Kids 
Are Adopted, FUSION (July 17, 2015), http://fusion.net/story/168764/a-series-of-new 
-lawsuits-is-challenging-how-native-american-kids-are-adopted. 
209. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody 
Proceedings, 80 Fed. Reg. 10146, 10149 (Feb. 25, 2015). 
210. Tolan, supra note 208. 
211. See id. 
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The original goal of ICWA was to combat the widespread 
prejudice against Indian customs.212 Through the Act, Congress 
sought to demonstrate that Native and non-Native child rearing 
practices were not in conflict; though traditional Native customs 
might differ from Anglo-American child rearing norms, these 
practices could, and in fact were likely to, protect a child’s best 
interest.213 As stated in the preamble, the goal of ICWA is “to protect 
the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families.”214 Unfortunately, as both 
Dollar General and recent ICWA cases demonstrate, the distrust of 
tribal traditions is well entrenched in American society, and it may 
take more than new regulations to change how non-Indians view 
Indian families and Indian practices in general. 
V. THE FUTURE 
Some of the distrust of tribal customs is simple prejudice. 
Nevertheless, cases like Santa Clara and the Cherokee Freedmen 
cases make it harder to dismiss non-Indian concerns regarding tribal 
justice.215 As Dollar General demonstrated, legitimate concerns 
regarding tribal traditions and justice paved the way for broader 
arguments in favor of limiting tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians.216 A decision favoring Dollar General would have been a 
 212. Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the 
“Existing Indian Family” Exception (Re)imposes Anglo American Legal Values on American 
Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329, 358 
(2009) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978)) (“ICWA was to establish standards for the 
removal of Indian children that would ‘reflect the unique values of Indian culture’ 
and provide ‘assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service 
programs.’”). 
 213. See id. at 365 (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 
30, 34–35 (1989)) (“One of the most serious failings of the present system is that 
Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by non-tribal 
government authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural 
and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the 
individuals who decide the fate of our children are at best ignorant of our cultural 
values, and at worst contemptful of the Indian way and convinced that removal, 
usually to a non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian child.”). 
214. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978). 
 215. Zug, supra note 23 (“Historically, when tribal and Anglo-American values 
were in conflict, non-Indians tended to disparage tribal values as backwards, 
inferior, and unjust. These instances put tribal sovereignty at risk, as evidenced by 
[Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez].”). 
216. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 163, at *16. 
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devastating blow to tribal sovereignty. The narrow victory in that case 
should serve as a warning: Using tribal sovereignty to protect 
discriminatory traditions can wind up harming tribal sovereignty in 
the long run. This is particularly true right now when tribes are just 
beginning to regain an important measure of criminal jurisdiction 
over both Indian and non-Indian defendants.217 
The first major change to tribal court criminal jurisdiction 
occurred in 2010, when President Obama signed the Tribal Law and 
Order Act (TLOA),218 which allowed tribes to impose stronger 
penalties on Indian defendants charged with serious crimes.219 A few 
years later, tribal court criminal jurisdiction was expanded further; 
in 2013, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was amended to 
permit tribal governments to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indian defendants and impose harsher sentences on them.220 
Although both of these changes were implemented in order to help 
tribes address the domestic violence crisis plaguing Indian country, 
they were still highly contentious.221 The VAWA amendments only 
passed after numerous “safeguards” were put in place to ensure the 
defendants would be treated fairly, meaning would be treated fairly 
as if they were being tried in a non-Indian court.222 One author 
217. See infra note 218–20 and accompanying text. 
 218. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 
2261 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
219. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012) (defining crimes to which enhanced sentences 
may be applied). 
 220. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-
4, § 4, 127 Stat. 54, 120–21. 
 221. The Court’s recent unanimous decision in U.S. v Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 
1966 (2016), may indicate that, at least with Indian defendants, increased tribal 
court jurisdiction is becoming less controversial. In that case, the Court held there 
was no Sixth Amendment violation when the federal court used Bryant’s previous 
tribal court convictions for domestic violence to charge him as a “habitual offender” 
and subject him to an increased sentence. However, even if Bryant does portend 
such a change with regard to Indian defendants, it may have little implication for 
acceptance of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. There is a long history of greater 
acceptance of tribal court jurisdiction over Indians, including non-member Indians. 
See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 222. Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Violence Against Woman Act Special Domestic Violence 
Criminal Jurisdiction, TRIBAL ACCESS TO JUST. INNOVATION, 
http://www.tribaljustice.org/program-profiles/violence-against-women-act-special 
-domestic-violence-criminal-jurisdiction (last visited Jan. 6, 2017) (“The Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 contains a series of legal requirements 
that must be satisfied in order for a tribe to exercise Special Domestic Violence 
Criminal Jurisdiction. These requirements act as procedural safeguards to ensure 
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reviewing the legislation noted that “[s]ome members of Congress 
had fought hard to derail the legislation, arguing that non-Indian 
men would be unfairly convicted without due process by sovereign 
nations whose unsophisticated tribal courts were not equal to the 
American criminal justice system.”223 Due to these objections, the 
Obama administration was only able to push through the narrowest 
version of the law—the law does not cover child abuse or sexual 
assaults committed by non-Indians who are not in a relationship with 
their victims.224 Still, it was an important first step.225 
In the spring of 2015, three “pilot” tribes began hearing 
domestic violence cases involving non-Indian defendants.226 Indian 
advocates hope that these pioneering tribes will allay fears about the 
sophistication and fairness of tribal courts.227 Tribes hamper such 
efforts, however, when they use their sovereignty and customs to 
defend otherwise unconstitutional laws. As Dollar General 
demonstrated, the widespread perception that tribal customs are 
foreign and unjust poses a real threat to tribal sovereignty.228 
Consequently, tribes should think long and hard before using their 
sovereignty to insist on preserving laws that the majority of 
Americans consider unjust.229 Accordingly, tribes affirming the right 
that non-Indian defendants are provided the due process protections that they 
would receive in federal or state court.”). 
223. SARI HOROWITZ, JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 31 (2015) (ebook). 
 224. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, § 4. VAWA of 2013 
requires the tribe to prove that the victim and defendant were in an “intimate” or 
“dating” relationship before moving forward with prosecution. 
225. See HOROWITZ, supra note 223, at 31. 
226. Justice Department Announces Three Tribes to Implement Special Domestic Violence 
Criminal Jurisdiction Under VAWA 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 6, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-three-tribes      
-implement-special-domestic-violence-criminal (selecting Pascua Yaqui, Umatilla, 
and Tulalip as the three tribes for the pilot project). 
 227. See id. (“[B]y certifying certain tribes to exercise jurisdiction over these 
crimes, we will help decrease domestic and dating violence in Indian Country, 
strengthen tribal capacity to administer justice and control crime, and ensure that 
perpetrators of sexual violence are held accountable for their criminal behavior.”). 
 228. See, e.g., Max Minzner, Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and 
Outside Indian Country, 6 NEV. L.J. 89, 104 (2005) (“In traditional courts, custom 
often trumps other sources of decisional law, including statutes and federal law, in 
a way that is very dissimilar to the use of common law in state courts. In these types 
of courts, there is some reason to believe that non-members will be subjected to a 
system that is foreign and unfamiliar and thus lacks a level playing field.”). 
 229. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69 n.28 (1978) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 90-841, at 6 (1967)) (“The purpose of [ICRA] is to protect individual 
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to ban same-sex-marriages should consider that such an assertion of 
sovereignty may ultimately prove threatening to tribal autonomy at 
large. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Tribal customs and traditions have often been used to unfairly 
deprive Indian tribes of their jurisdiction, their land, and even their 
children. At the same time, tribes have also relied on their customs 
and traditions to justify practices that many believe unfairly deprive 
tribal members of their rights. In this, tribes are not unique. The 
United States has a long history of refusing to recognize the rights of 
women, racial minorities, and other disfavored groups. In many 
cases, it has taken decades or even centuries to correct these 
injustices. Unfortunately, Indian tribes do not have the luxury of 
time. When tribes insist on continuing practices that American law 
has rejected as discriminatory and unjust, they risk proliferating the 
perception that tribal justice is generally unfair. Certain tribal 
customs and traditions may justify running such a risk, but it is 
doubtful that same-sex marriage bans fall into this category. 
For the first time in decades, tribes are beginning to exercise 
their sovereign power to protect their communities, particularly 
their women and children, from horrific violence. The importance 
of this change cannot be overstated. It would be a tragedy if banning 
same-sex marriage derailed this achievement. 
Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions by tribal governments.”). 
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